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ABSTRACT
The emergence of network processors provides a broad range of new applications,
particularly in the field of network security. Firewalls have become one of the basic building
blocks of implementing a network's security policy; however, the security of a firewall can
potentially lead to a bottleneck in the network. Therefore, improving the performance of the
firewall means also improving the performance of the protected network. With the ability to
direcdy monitor and modify packet information at wire speeds, the network processor provides
a new avenue for the pursuit of faster, more efficient firewall products. This paper describes the
implementation of two simulated network processor based firewalls. The first architecture, a
basic packet filtering firewall, utilizes tree-based structures for manipulating IP and transport
level firewall rules while also utilizing parallelism available in the network processor during
firewall rule look-ups. In the second architecture, a parallel firewall is created using a network
processor based, load-balancing switch along with two network processor based firewall
machines, both utilizing the basic packet filter operations of the first architecture. When added
to existing routing software, these implementations demonstrate the feasibility of creating
dynamic packet-filtering routers using network processor technology.
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GLOSSARY
Application Gateway: Also known as a "Proxy, " a program used to provide the user authentication and
application connection mechanisms of an application layer firewall.
ASO - Advanced Software Offering: Software package developed by IBM including code for a dynamic router
application on the IBM PowerNP 4GS3.
Bastion Hosts: A secured network machine or server.
Blade: One instance of an IBM PowerNP 4GS3 board. Usage example: 'Tackets can be transferred between
multiple blades over a proprietary IBM switch
fabric."
BSD - Berkley Software Distribution: Unix standard developed by the University ofCalifornia, Berkley.
DMZ - Demilitarized Zone: A separate network behind a firewall that provides public access to certain network
services.
FPM - Full Pattern Match: Type of search algorithm used by the IBM PowerNP 4GS3 to look-up data elements
in a tree. For a given search key, the data element with the longest preceding string ofmatching bits will
be returned.
GUI - Graphical User Interface: Interface to a application using graphical control, rather than text commands.
ICMP - Internet ControlMessage Protocol: Protocol used for testing connectivity between networks ('Ting").
ICT Intelligent Connection-Tracking: Maintenance of connection state, as done by circuit-level firewalls, used
by CYCON's Labyrinth firewall.
IP - Internet Protocol: Layer 3 routing protocol that is predominandy used in the Internet
LPM - Longest Prefix Match: Type of search algorithm used by the IBM PowerNP 4GS3 to look-up data
elements in a tree. For a given search key, the data element with the longest preceding string ofmatching
bits will be returned.
NAT Network Address Translation: Process of mapping an external IP address to an internal IP address
performed by a firewall or other such system. This is done in order to hide internal IP addresses from the
outside world or to eliminate direct connections between internal and external hosts.
NP - Network Processor: A programmable communications integrated circuit capable of performing packet
classification, packet modification, queue/policymanagement, and/or packet forwarding.
Packet Filter: Simple firewall that drops or
"filters"
packets based on simple protocol header values, including
primarily IP source and destination address, network and transport layer protocol type, or TCP/UDP
source and destination port.
Picocode: Term meaning IBM PowerNP 4GS3 assembly language code
Proxy: Program used to provide the user authentication mechanisms of an application layer firewall.
QoS - Quality of Service: The priority given to network traffic traveling across a router or firewall. For example,
traffic from a certain host may be given a higher precedence than traffic originating from another host in
order to avoid those packets being dropped, in the case of a congested network.
Security Policy: Broad term representing the applications and their associated functions put in place to provide
security to a given network. For example, the rules used by a firewall are a portion of the network's
security policy.
Spoofing Attack Network attack in which the IP or TCP fields of a packet are overwritten or falsified by an
intruder in order to penetrate the filtering algorithms of a firewall.
Stateful Inspection: Firewall technique ofmamtaining state information for existing connections across the across
the firewall and filtering based on rules given for specific states.
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Static Firewall: Name often used when referring to packet filtering firewalls, as the filtration rule is typically based
on a fixed, existing protocol.
TCP - Transport Control Protocol: Reliable transport layer protocol providing end-to-end routing.
UDP - User Datagram Protocol: Unreliable transport layer protocol providing end-to-end routing.
VPN - Virtual Private Network Network comprised of two physically separated networks communicating as a
single, virtual network over an un-trusted network, such as the Internet. Communications between the
separated networks are usefully transferred using encryption techniques over the un-trusted network.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Purpose ofFirewall Research
With the expansive growth in recent years of network technology, including the Internet and
e-commerce, network security has become a giant theme in the field of data communications.
Large corporations and government agencies, among many others, must rely on the security of
their network solutions to protect highly sensitive information and to maintain the proper
function of their electronic interactions. As time has progressed, these network structures have
become increasingly threatened by attacks from external entities, ranging from the robbery of
secretive or private information to the exploits of hackers simply attempting to break those
barriers that are supposedly unbreakable. These threats and others have led to the rapid growth
of the network security industry.
Firewalls have since become the primary tool of protecting a network. Firewalls aim to
protect a network by providing a single entry and exit point for network traffic, at which a
security policy may be enforced. In other words, the firewall is the gateway between a trusted
network and an un-trusted network, such as the Internet.
*, .
'
jgVrr j
Protected Network
Figure 1.1 - Simple FirewallDiagram
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Because the firewall is the single point of entry and exit for a network, it is clear that the
network is only as secure as the firewall that protects it. In addition, as it creates a single point
for concentrating network traffic, a firewall is also vulnerable to causing a bottleneck in the
performance of the network. It is for these two principal reasons, security and performance,
that firewall research is a necessary area of study in the field of data communications. By
affecting the quality of the firewall, one direcdy affects the quality of the network.
1.2 Organization ofThesis
This thesis will be used to identify the shortcomings of existing firewall technology and to
explore the feasibility of improving firewall technology through network processors. In order to
demonstrate the abilities of network processors to enhance firewall performance, the IBM 4GS3
network processor will be used as an example platform.
A summary of the history of firewall technology will first be given in order to provide a basis
for firewall design goals. Next, a discussion of the relative strengths and weaknesses of various
firewall technologies will be given, along with a survey of current firewall technology. It will be
shown that the weaknesses of existing firewalls relate primarily to finding a balance between
quality of security and performance.
Some of the areas of research that have grown out of firewall technology will also be
described, and it will be shown that network processors and the abilities they possess have not
yet been explored in a research environment. This thesis explores two firewall implementations
using a network processor. To begin, a basic packet filtering firewall is developed and compared
in terms of performance to an existing packet filter technology. This basic packet filter is then
expanded to a version involving two network processors acting in parallel in order to provide
increased performance and reliability. These implementations hope to show that network
processors possess the ability to allow more complex firewalls with higher efficiencies than
existing technologies.
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1.3 Contributions
Because firewalls continue to be both the focal point of network security implementations
and the focal point of communication for a protected network, it is absolutely necessary that
they possess the highest level of performance while also achieving an adequate level of security.
Unfortunately, existing firewall technology tends to succeed at achieving only one of these two
characteristics before the cost becomes uneconomic.
The network processor, which has become a popular theme in recent networking
advancements, provides a unique ability in the firewall world to combine the speed of hardware
with the diverse security functionality achievable by a software firewall solution. This thesis
performs two approaches to firewall implementations in order to demonstrate the feasibility of
implementing a firewall on a network processor in addition to the abilities of network
processors to enhance firewall performance.
While there are many areas of research in firewall technology and network security, the
network processor has yet to be fully explored. This thesis hopes to show that the network
processor has the potential to become the cornerstone of network security in the future.
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Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Firewall Technology
Firewall technology provides protection for the resources and information of a trusted
network by allowing the controlled filtration of network traffic. This is accomplished by
creating a centralized point at which a security policy may be enforced. The following sections
provide some of the history of firewall technology and describe in detail the various types of
firewalls that have been developed.
2.1.1 Firewall History
The firewall industry has been growing rapidly in recent years in order to meet the growing
needs of businesses to protect their networks from outside attack. While growth has made the
Internet security industry rather large, the industry itself is still relatively young. This section
provides a brief chronology of firewall development, found primarily in [17]. The individual
types of firewalls are described more specifically in section 2.1.3.
Research in firewall technology began in the mid 1980's and has led to the emergence of
several types of firewalls. The first type of firewall is known as the packet filter. Papers on this
very basic implementation were not released until 1 988. These papers were studies published by
Jeff Mogul of Digital Equipment Corporation. Shortly thereafter, AT&T Bell Laboratories
(Dave Presotto and Howard Trickey) began research in a second generation of firewall called
circuit level firewalls, which were based on their proprietary circuit relay technology.
This same group from Bell Laboratories was also the first to complete the development of
a third generation, called application gateways. In [17], it was noted that no products or
publications relating to this technology were released at the time. However, there were several
private groups that began performing research on application gateways in the late 1980's, and in
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the early 1990's published documents on their work. Authors of such publications included
Gene Spafford of Purdue University, Bill Cheswick (also from AT&T Bell Laboratories), and
Marcus Ranum. Of these, Ranum's work, involving bastion hosts running proxy services, drew
the most attention and progressed into first commercial product, SEAL from Digital
Equipment Corporation.
The next type of firewall to emerge, dynamic packet filters, was developed in the timeframe
of 1991 by Bill Cheswick and Steve Bellovin from Bell Laboratories. Bob Braden and Annette
DeSchon from USC's Information Sciences Institute further researched this technology in 1992,
and in 1994 the first commercial product was released by Check Point Software.
In 1996 Scott Wiegel ofGlobal Internet Software Group, Inc. began the development of a
fifth type of firewall architecture, the Kernel Proxy architecture. This architecture was used by
Cisco (the publishers of [17]) in their Centri Firewall released in 1997.
Check Point Software introduced the Stateful Inspection firewall architecture in 1999 as
part of their Firewall-1 product. This architecture has formed the basis ofmany of today's most
complex firewall systems, by combining nearly all of the characteristics of the packet filter,
circuit level, and application gateway firewalls.
Below is a timeline of firewall development, modified from a diagram in [17]. Again,
details of the individual classifications of firewalls are discussed in section 2.1.3.
Packet filter
1980 I
Dynamic
packet filter
Application
layer
firewall
Circuit level
Firewall
I1990 f
Stateful
Inspection
Kernal Proxy~
I t 2000
Figure 2.1 - Timeline ofFirewallDevelopment
2.1.2 Key Firewall Characteristics
Before describing the specific types of firewalls and the operations they perform, it is
important to understand some of the basic properties and principal characteristics of a firewall.
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As mentioned in the Introduction, a key aspect to a firewall is that it be the single point of
entry and exit between the protected network and outside networks, which is illustrated in
Figure 2.2. This idea is the basis of firewall design and implementation. If the firewall is not the
sole point of access to the protected network, security cannot be guaranteed, and the protected
network becomes highly vulnerable to means of attack, such as the so-called "back door" attack.
In such situations, it is possible to bypass the firewall mechanism and connect to the protected
network using alternate means, such as through a modem connection or an insecure wireless
access point. This scenario is shown below.
[fo q o o |] Modem Connection
"Back Door" Connection
hns
If*
t mm
fSirtVX
W^-^'
Wireless Access
Point
L
Wireless Access
Hacker PC
Modem Connection lT T
Firewall Router
Protected Network
Figure 2.2 - BackDoorVulnerabilityUsing a Modem orWireless Connection
Another important aspect of a firewall is its security policy. The security policy is the set of
rules that defines how the firewall is to permit or deny network traffic. These rules are directed
at a wide variety of characteristics about the traffic and could potentially involve rules based on
IP addresses, port numbers, user authentication, arbitrary connection attempts, and protocols
used. It is the security policy that defines the firewall for a given network; therefore, the firewall
administratormust take great care in setting up the appropriate restrictions on network traffic.
In addition to filter rules based on the properties just mentioned, firewalls have evolved to
perform numerous advanced security functions, as described in [1]. For example, they may be
required to maintain state information about multiple sessions accessing the secured network.
This could involve the enforcement of timeout rules or monitoring the specific types of
Firewall Strategies UsingNetwork Processors
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transactions that might occur. In cases where throughput is an important concern, such as in
multi-media applications, firewalls might be forced to support special low overhead protocols
(i.e. UDP). Tokens or single-use passwords for user authentication may be issued by the firewall
when allowing connection requests. Lasdy, firewalls may even be used to perform encryption or
decryption traffic in order to create virtual private networks (VPNs - see section 2.5.2) over un-
trusted networks, such as the Internet.
Logging is another desirable characteristic of a firewall. It is useful for security
administrators to have a record of all connections, incoming and outgoing, that occur across the
firewall. Logging failed access attempts across the firewall could also be important in order to
expose potential weaknesses in the firewall.
Because the firewall is the focal point for network traffic, the firewall is extremely
vulnerable to becoming a bottleneck for network traffic that accesses the protected network.
For this reason, it is critical that the process of validating network traffic across the firewall be as
efficient as possible. The more efficient the firewall, the better performance the network will
have.
The transparency of a firewall is the degree to which the actions performed by the firewall,
in order to provide security for the protected network, are noticeable to the user. Transparency
relates to efficiency, however differs slightly in that it embodies a larger scope of concepts. If
the efficiency of the firewall is poor, users of the protected network will notice a slow-down in
communication across the firewall. Obviously this implies poor transparency, as the effects of
the firewall are noticeable. Transparency can also be affected by user authentication. Once a
firewall has been installed, it may be necessary for a user of the protected network to
authenticate with the firewall before accessing the protected network. The transparency of the
firewall would be considerably low because of the added step in using the protected network.
While transparency is a good thing to maintain when designing a firewall, it is certainly a double-
edged sword. In general, the more security a firewall needs to provide, the less transparent it
will be. Therefore, as in any design situation, a balance between security and transparency for a
given firewallmust be reached.
Finally, the physical implementation of the firewall is also a defining characteristic. In
current technology, firewalls are implemented as either a single piece of software, or a
combination of a hardware appliance and accompanying software. When the responsibilities of
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a firewall are limited to simple filtering tasks such as those based on strictiy IP addresses or port
numbers, a hardware-based firewall is a popular choice. The simplicity of the filtering rules
(security policy) and repetitive comparisons that occur lend themselves naturally to a hardware
solution. Such hardware allows this type of network traffic validation to occur at higher speeds,
therefore rninimizing the effect of the firewall on network performance (improving
transparency). Example hardware includes routers with filtering capabilities ("filtering routers")
or dedicated firewall appliances. Firewall operations involvingmore procedural activities such as
user authentication are most often implemented in software, as an application running on top of
an operating system. It should be noted that operating systems might also be modified to
perform packet-filtering operations; however, such an implementation will be noticeably slower
than hardware systems. Several specific examples of both hardware and software solutions will
be discussed in section 2.3.1. Because most current firewall implementations require simple
packet filtering, in addition to complex authentication operations, systems combining filtering
routers and OS firewall applications are often employed.
No matter the physical devices being used, the purpose of a firewall is to make a protected
network as secure as possible by concentrating its efforts at a single point. There are a variety of
operations a firewall may perform; however, it is most important to properly match the
capabilities of the firewall with security needs of the organization or network being protected.
2.1.3 Types of Firewalls
In section 2.1.1, a timeline of firewall development was presented. Packet filtering
firewalls, circuit level firewalls, and application gateways are considered the fundamental forms
of existing firewalls, while dynamic packet filters, kernel proxy, and stateful inspection firewalls
are considered to be conglomerations of the original three. This section describes each type in
further detail.
2.1.3.1 Packet Filtering Firewalls
Packet filters are the most basic type of firewall. In this type of firewall, each mcoming
network packet is compared against defined rules based on low-level protocol fields.
Depending on the rule and the contents of a packet, it is either dropped or forwarded by the
firewall. For example, the Internet uses IP for routing and most often uses TCP for transport
Q Matthew E Mariani, June, 2001
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layer functionality. The format of these protocols is shown on the following page. Most
existing packet filters use combinations of the IP source and destination address and TCP
source and destination port with verification of the transport layer protocol being used.
Naturally, other fields in any of the protocols may be used. As an example, a firewall
32 bits -
Verston 1HL type ot-servce Total length
iacrtlificaliixi Flags Fragment ousel
Header enecksumure-itHive | Protocol |
_._. .._ i . .
| Ssurc& address |
| Destination add'ass |
Options n- padiinoi
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Figure 2.3 - IPv4 Packet Figure 2.4 - TCP Packet Format
could accept all TCP and UDP traffic, but deny all traffic using some alternate transport layer
protocol. In this case, the foreign protocol could represent an attack on the protected network.
It is relatively clear that in order to setup such a firewall, it is necessary to have detailed
knowledge of the protocols being used within the protected network. The administrator may
modify the specific field values being monitored by the firewall, but the fields utilized by the
firewall are obviously fixed to the protocol being used. For this reason, packet filters are often
referred to as static firewalls.
Packet filters may handle network traffic in one of two ways. First, all packets could be
accepted unless explicidy denied by the firewall rule, or secondly, all packets could be denied
unless explicidy permitted. The first version is appropriate when the level of network security is
relatively low, such as in college campus networks, because access to the network is usually
granted by default. The second would be useful where security is more essential, as in a
government intelligence agency or corporate network.
The advantages of packet filtering firewalls are as follows. Because packet filters are based
on simple comparisons between the filter rules and the protocol field values of network traffic,
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they tend to be rather simple to implement. This simplicity allows packet filters to provide a
fast, efficient, and generally inexpensive solution. For this reason, packet filters have been
integrated at a hardware level into routers (as mentioned before, these are called filtering routers
or choking routers). Packet filters also have the benefits of being able to hide internal IP
addresses from external networks and avoiding the need to configure internal hosts individually.
All the "work" is done by the firewall.
On the negative side, the static nature of packet filters makes them rather un-adaptable to
the introduction of new protocols. In many cases, adding a new protocol to the network means
direct modification of the existing firewall, which can often be a costiy expenditure, especially if
a hardware firewall solution has been used. Next, because packet filters simply make brainless
comparisons, they are highly vulnerable to "spoofing" attacks. In spoofing attacks, protocol
fields such as the IP source and destination address are falsified, in order to break through the
firewall. It is a trivial task for a hacker to perform such an attack. This weakness exists partly
because packet filters are not able to perform user authentication. On a higher level, packet
filters do not possess the ability to examine or to modify the content of a packet. This leaves
them vulnerable to content-related problems, such as the transmission of viruses, application
layer violations, etc. Lasdy, packet filters do not maintain any state or session information after
connections occur across the firewall. In summary, packet filters have the ability to regulate
where a packet may travel (i.e. across the firewall), but do not have the ability to affect or to
filter based upon the application level data thatmight be communicated.
2.1.3.2 Circuit Level Firewalls
The next type of firewall, the circuit level firewall, provides security at a slighdy higher level
than packet filters, by preventing direct connections between internal and external machines
[14]. Circuit level firewalls have the ability to determine whether a packet is a connection
request or is part of an existing, validated connection.
The key feature of this type of firewall that differs from the packet filter is that circuit level
firewalls maintain a small amount of state information, in the form of a table of all connections
between internal and external networks. When a connection request arrives, the firewall adds
the request to its table and tracks the state of the connection through the handshaking steps
required by the transport layer protocol until the connection (or circuit) is established. In the
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Internet, this is usually TCP. As each packet arrives, the firewall searches its connection table
for a matching session. If one is found and is validated, the packet may pass across the firewall.
If a match is not found, the packet is dropped. In order to perform the appropriate checks, the
firewall could maintain session information including a session identifier unique for each
connection, the specific state of the connection (i.e. handshaking, etc), sequencing information,
source and destination IP address, and/or the physical interface through which the connection
is established [17]. Because circuit level firewalls will only permit the transmission of a packet if
the associated connection is in a valid state, the actions of circuit level firewalls are at very low-
level compared to true stateful inspection firewalls (see section 2.1.3.6).
To further protect against spoofing attacks, circuit level firewalls may even modify the
destination addresses ofpackets in order to make the packets appear to have originated from the
firewall host, rather than the actual source machine. This technique is known as network
address translation (NAT).
Circuit level firewalls have several advantages and disadvantages. The ability to maintain
state information about connection requests is a substantial benefit in protecting a network
against spoofing attacks. Also, because circuit level firewalls work at a relatively low level of the
protocol stack, they still possess relatively fast performance. On the other hand, like packet
filters, this type of firewall is tied permanendy to the transport protocol used by the network (i.e.
TCP). Also, circuit level firewalls also lack authentication mechanisms and the ability to filter
based on application layer criteria.
2.1.3.3 Application Gateway Firewalls (Proxies)
Application layer firewalls, also called application gateways, perform filtering based on
application layer protocols rather than at the network or transport layer, thus giving the firewall
the ability to perform user authentication including username and password validation. Like the
firewalls described so far, the application gate resides between a protected network and the
outside world. Most application gateways operate by running a special purpose program
designed to perform the security functions of the firewall. These special purpose programs are
often called
"proxies"
or "proxy
servers."
Proxy servers are written specifically for each
application protocol being used. For example, a protected network running telnet and ftp
would need individual telnet and ftp proxies.
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When a user wants to communicate with another system across the proxy, it is the proxy
that performs the user authentication and security checks (usually through username and
password), rather than the actual client. It is a goal for this authentication to be transparent to
the user, so that the user observes direct communication with the client service. Like circuit
level firewalls, no direct connections are actually made between the two systems. Because of
this, application layer firewalls may perform most of the same security checks that are
performed by circuit level firewalls, including checks against address spoofing. Application
gateways are also capable of performing network address translation. A diagram of the proxy
architecture from [1 7] is shown below.
Real client
jgjsga^ JiSSL JUKSu
Internal
Figure 2.5 - Application Layer FirewallArchitecture
Application gateways are implemented as programs running on top of a host operating
system. Thus, each packet must pass up the entire network protocol stack and then pass into
the application domain of the proxy system before being inspected. If the packet is validated, it
must then pass back down the protocol stack for re-transmission. Because of this necessary,
intermediate series of steps, application layer firewalls are comparatively slow solutions.
Proxy servers are beneficial because they are able to understand and enforce higher-level
protocols that packet filters and circuit level firewalls cannot. Therefore, proxies are capable of
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performing a large variety of security operations, in addition to those ofmore primitive firewalls.
In addition to items such as user authentication, they are well suited to perform such things as
connection logs and NAT. While the list of benefits for proxies is rather extensive, the list of
negatives is equally long. To name a few, running a proxy on a server often requires
modifications to the native network stack. Plus, proxies are vulnerable if a hacker can find a
hole in low-level protocols that do not reach the application layer. Next, a unique proxy must
be written for each protected application and each new protocol making scalability a poor
quality. Proxies listen on the connection port of the application, thus you cannot run
application servers on the firewall server. Most importandy, proxies add a significant
performance delay to the network. In order to balance the authentication abilities of proxies
and the speed of packet filters, it is no surprise that combinational firewall systems are typically
the norm.
2.1.3.4 Dynamic Packet Filters
This next type of firewall, the dynamic packet filter, is a more recent type of firewall
technology. Dynamic packet filters combine basic packet filtering with the creation of dynamic
stateful rules for connections across the firewall.
As with packet filters, this type of firewall ensures that all network traffic conforms to the
network security policy by validating the IP source/destination addresses and the TCP port
numbers of existing connections. When a connection request occurs, the firewall allows a
limited amount of time for the receiver to respond. Assuming a response occurs with the
appropriate IP and TCP port information, the firewallmay deduce the existence of a host on an
un-trusted network. The dynamic packet filter then begins storing limited state information,
similar to a circuit-level firewall. However, these connections are established with stateful rules
that may be modified on the fly (dynamically). Each connection is unique by definition, and the
dynamic rules reflect the state of the connection at any moment in time. This occurs even if
multiple connections exist between the same two hosts, and the connection is immediately
invalidated if the receiving host does not respond within the allotted portion of time. All
network traffic associated with a given connection is validated by an application running on the
host machine, which allows for more extensive security checks relating to the connection.
-I 5 Matthew E Mariani, June, 2001
Firewall Strategies UsingNetwork Processors L ~"
Therefore, this type of firewall combines some of the characteristics of both low-level and
application layer firewalls.
Dynamic packet filters have the greatest significance when used with applications that utilize
transport protocols for limited information requests. Typically this is a stateless protocol like
UDP or ICMP. In general, dynamic packet filters are less secure than application layer firewalls
(there is no user authentication); however, they are more secure than circuit-level firewalls and
packet filters. Performance characteristics place this firewall between application layer firewalls
and lower-level types.
2.1.3.5 Kernel Proxies
The next type of firewall, the kernel proxy, is another more recent approach at firewall
implementation. This type of firewall was found in [17], and was introduced as part of Cisco's
Centri Firewall product.
As the name implies, kernel proxies provide proxy security services; however, these services
are integrated into the kernel rather than operating at the application level. The goal of a kernel
proxy is to optimize the efficiency of the firewall by handling security functions at only the levels
of the protocol stack that are applicable. This can be illustrated using some of the previously
discussed firewalls. Packet filters, as mentioned, perform simple comparisons on network and
transport (i.e. IP and TCP) layer fields. From an operating system perspective, these fields are
handled relatively low in the network stack. On the other hand, the user authentication that
must be performed in application level firewalls requires packet information to be passed up the
entire protocol stack into the application domain for processing by the proxy server. In other
words, different firewalls process information at different levels in the protocol stack.
The kernel proxy methodology attempts to combine the security features of both low level
firewalls (packet filters) and high level firewalls (application gateways) by executing the security
services within the kernel space and using the application level services only necessary. When a
packet arrives, the information is passed up the stack of appropriate kernel proxies. At each
layer, the appropriate proxy service performs its security checks and passes the packet to the
next layer if and only if necessary (meaning the packet is valid at the current layer). Each layer's
proxies may maintain state information to make security
decisions. For example, the Cisco
Centri implementation used a set of eight kernel proxies [17]. An IP proxy handles source and
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destination address checks. Another proxy exists for TCP variables. Higher-level proxies also
exist for activities such as FTP and telnet, and could forward user authentication requests to
higher-level extension applications as necessary. An incoming FTP request would be passed
through the IP, TCP, and FTP kernel proxies only, rather than the entire protocol stack.
By implementing these proxy services within the kernel, this type of firewall is able to
increase the performance of the firewall by handling security checks exacdywhen they should be
performed. Kernel proxies help avoid the case where invalid network packets unnecessarily
reach the application layer for processing.
2.1.3.6 Stateful Inspection Firewalls
Similar to kernel proxies, the stateful inspection firewall is a hybrid of the three basic types
of firewalls: packet filters, circuit level firewalls, and application gateways. Like packet filters,
this type of firewall is able to filter packets at the network layer. Using knowledge of the
application level protocols, the firewall is able to maintain state information on all existing
connections at the application level. The firewall can then make decisions whether or not to
permit certain communication or operations based on the current connection status. For
example, decisions could be made on user privileges or the connection source and destination.
Most importandy, mamtaining state through the observation of application content allows
the firewall to permit uninterrupted, direct connections between a source and destination
system. While proxy services (application gateway firewall) require the user to be authenticated
by the firewall, the stateful inspection system makes the firewall transparent to end-users by
recording the state of the session (including user authentication) between the source and
destination machine. In addition, stateful inspection eliminates the need to run a separate
service (proxy) for each application level protocol.
In summary, stateful inspection firewalls are able to provide the security features of all three
basic firewall types, while adding a level of transparency not found in typical application
gateways. Naturally, offering this high level of security along with transparency makes stateful
inspection systems highly complex and often very expensive.
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2.2 Firewall Considerations
As long as they are the single point of entry to a protected network, firewalls are effective
means of providing security. However, firewalls are not perfect in all respects. This section
summarizes the limitations and shortcomings of firewall technology.
2.2.1 Firewall Limitations
The botdeneck problem, which has already been introduced, is perhaps the key limitation to
using a firewall for network security. The apparent speed of the protected network is direcdy
related to the quality of the firewall. As the complexity, transparency, and scalability increase,
the performance decreases. It should be noted that while the performance impact of the firewall
is a disadvantage, the bottleneck for network traffic is necessary in order to centralize the
application of the network's security policy.
The simple firewall architectures, packet filters and circuit level firewalls, exhibit the highest
amount ofperformance and efficiency, but sacrifice a variety of desirable characteristics in order
to maintain high filtering speeds. To begin, these firewall types are highly vulnerable to so-called
"content-related"
attacks. Packet filters and circuit level firewalls lack the ability to look into the
content carried the application layer protocols of a packet. Thus, the application layer can be
used as a carrier for application attacks or the transfer of viruses. If an attacker is able to
penetrate the firewall, through techniques such as "IP
spoofing,"
the protected network is
completely vulnerable to malicious traffic contained in the application layer of the packets. A
second shortcoming of simplistic firewalls is the ability to perform user authentication. The
ability to perform user authentication also requires the firewall to look into application level
information, an ability that simple filters do not possess, as just mentioned. The ability to
maintain detailed state information is yet another characteristic that packet filters and circuit
level firewalls do not possess. Maintaining the state of an application level connection across the
firewall ensures that valid operations are occurring throughout the duration of the connection.
A final drawback of packet filters is inability to modify the content of packets passing through
the firewall. This would allow the firewall to perform techniques such as address redirection and
network address translation. All of these shortcomings must be considered when using simple
filtering firewalls. If application level filtration is required, a more complicated, although slower,
firewall will be required.
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There are also a variety of limitations that are applicable to firewall technologies in general.
One inherent limitation is the dependence on given protocols. Any security policy must be
defined with respect to a specific set of protocols. For example, filtering firewalls are typically
implemented to filter against IP or IPX at the network layer and TCP or UDP at the transport
layer. Similarly, higher-level firewalls depend on the format of the application level protocols
(i.e. FTP and telnet). Introducing a new protocol or application to a network usually requires a
modification to the firewall. This process is often a difficult job, especially for simple, low level
filtering architectures, where scalability is often not considered. Only a small amount ofmodern
firewall products allow the ability to easily add new or custom protocols to the protected
network.
Another inherent dependency, especially in the case of application level firewalls, is a
reliance on the underlying operating system. In most cases, application level firewalls receive
packet information direcdy from the operating system. This places an assumption that the
underlying OS is reliable and secure. Unfortunately, this is not necessarily true. If an attacker is
able to penetrate the operating system, an application level firewall can be rendered ineffective.
It is for this reason that some commercial products have created secure, customized operating
systems to support their application level firewalls.
2.2.2 Providing Public Services
In a protected network environment, there are often services to which
"un-trusted"
users
should be or need to be given access. Examples include web (http), FTP, and DNS services.
The most popular implementation for this scenario is to provide a separate network behind the
firewall that implements a security policy, different from that of the primary network, that
allows public access to certain services. This separated network is often called the "demilitarized
zone,"
orDMZ (see Figure 2.6 on the following page).
A popular addition to a DMZ is to implement network address translation for the DMZ
services. Each server on the DMZ can be assigned an external IP address for the firewall.
Incoming requests for these services can then be translated by the firewall to their actual IP
address on the network behind the firewall. Therefore, the DMZ configuration is able to
provide separated public services while still maintaining a certain level of security.
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Figure 2.6 - Protected Networkwith a DMZ for Public Services
2.3 Existing Technology
As described in previous sections, there are a variety of firewall classifications, each ofwhich
adds a different aspect to firewall operation. Nearly every modern, high-end firewall application
is constructed by combining various attributes from each of the basic types of firewalls into a
single, more complicated solution. This section provides a brief overview of some existing
firewall technologies, from [7].
2.3.1 Commercial Products
The most secure of modern firewall products are based on the stateful inspection
architectures. Stateful Inspection was patented by Check Point Software in 1999 in their
Firewall-1 product. A key of aspect of Firewall-1 is that it operates within the operating system,
and begins inspecting packet information before the network layer in the protocol stack. This
feature is similar to the kernel proxy strategy of performing security functions early in the
protocol stack, in order to avoid accessing the application layer as little as possible. This, of
course, improves performance. CYCON offers a second firewall solution based on Stateful
Inspection called Labyrinth. In addition to the properties of stateful inspection, Labyrinth
advertises network address translation (NAT) abilities along with "intelligent connection
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tracking" (ICT). While NAT is a concept associated with circuit-level firewalls, the actual
purpose of ICT is to perform the function of a circuit-level firewall. When a packet arrives, ICT
circuit-level firewalls extract the IP and TCP connection information, which is then validated
against a state table of existing connections. Of course, as part of Stateful Inspection, Labyrinth
can also be configured to perform user authentication and dynamic filtering. Another Stateful
Inspection firewall product is NetGuard's Guardian Firewall System. Guardian's architecture is
unique in that its security operations occur beginning at the data link (i.e. MAC) layer. This is
lower in the protocol stack than both Firewall- 1 and Labyrinth. Sun Microsystems added their
Sunscreen SPF (an Internet gateway firewall), EFS (encryption server with strong gateway
functionality), and SKIP (end user and remote authenticated communication) models to the list
of Stateful Inspection based firewalls. The Sunscreen line aims to provide an end-to-end suite
of incrementallymore secure firewall enforcement points.
Several modern architectures use the concepts of circuit level and dynamic packet filtering
firewalls and in some cases have integrated these components into the OS kernel. CyberGuard's
Firewall uses an approach that is called "dynamic stateful rule"technology, a version of dynamic
packet filtering. Like dynamic packet filtering, CyberGuard's system provides packet-filtering
functionality with the ability to create dynamic rules on a per connection basis. In addition,
secure network and OS-level interfaces have been built direcdy into the operating system, thus
providing a trusted foundation for the firewall application. A similar product is Milkyway's
SecurIT FIREWALL. Like CyberGuard's Firewall, this product is based on an operating system
that has been "hardened" to protect against attacks on insecure processes running at the OS
level. The GNAT Box Firewall, from Global Technolgoy Associates, Inc. (GTA), is based on
network address translation (NAT). As described before, NAT completely hides the internal
network from the un-trusted world by eliminating the possibility of a direct connection between
internal and external hosts.
Simple application gateway architectures (proxies) are also a popular basis for inexpensive
firewalls. Trusted Information
Systems' Gaundet firewalls and Axent's Raptor Firewall are
examples of such, providing sets of highly secure proxy services. These proxy services are able
to perform the expected activities of application level firewalls, including user authentication and
application command filtering. AltaVista provides another application gateway based firewall
called the Active Firewall. As the name implies, a key feature of the firewall is that it attempts to
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actively detect network attacks and security violations, and then reacts by alerting an
administrator or shutting down the firewall. The InterLock Firewall from Advanced Network
and Services, Inc. (ANS) and the Cyberwall Plus firewall from Network-1 are application level
firewalls that attempt to perform intrusion detection (this is described in 2.5.3), in addition to
application level filtering services. BorderWare from Secure Computing, IBM's eNetwork
Firewall, and Ukiah's NetRoad FireWALL provide application gateway services that claim to
enhance the firewall by using "multiple levels ofsecurity."These multiple levels of security are
actually packet and circuit level filtering services that are provided in addition to the proxy
services of the firewall. Like CyberGuard's firewall and the SecurIT firewall, BorderWare and
IBM's eNetwork firewall are executed on security-hardened operating systems.
Secure Computing's Sidewinder Firewall provides a unique approach to an application
gateway through its Type Enforcement technology. This firewall uses a specialized BSD Unix
kernel that executes various applications in different "process domains." Presumably the
processes will need to communicate across domain boundaries. Type Enforcement stipulates
that any communication between any process domain and any data type must be given explicit
permission. For example, an FTP session running in one process domain must have explicit
permission to access a file in the data domain.
The following systems are comprised of a firewall appliance alongwith remote management
software and are marketed as hardware/software systems. WatchGuard Technologies claims to
have produced the first commercial firewall appliance called the WatchGuard System. This
product, based on a Pentium system with remote management software, aims to provide a cost-
effective firewall solution with all the major techniques for firewall implementation including
packet filtering, proxies, and Stateful Inspection. Technologies Interceptor Firewall is a
hardware and software solution based on proxy services. Cisco's PIX Firewall appliance offers
packet filtering and NAT services. It should be noted that most of these
"hardware"
systems
are simply PC-based systems enclosed in a special, vendor marked case. A variety of routers
with simple packet filtering capabilities also exist.
A list of firewall vendors is provided in Appendix A - FirewallVendors.
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2.3.2 Observations
Clearly the list of commercial firewall implementation is extensive. However, by studying
these technologies, it is possible to make several observations about existing technology. To
begin, the majority of firewalls are implemented as a software application. Many of these run on
top of the existing operating system at the application level, and in some cases, security
enhancements have been made to the operating system in order to improve performance.
However, even when implemented at the OS level, the bottleneck problem is a reality for these
(software-based) firewall systems. This is true because software cannot possibly run at the same
speed as the native hardware being used in the network. Features such as proxy services and
packet filtering will degrade the transparency of the firewall by either adding required steps for a
user to access the protected network or by simply slowing down the apparent speed of the
protected network.
In order to accommodate this fact, a trade-offmust be made between firewall performance
and the level of security provided. In most cases, the needs of the network determine which
characteristic is more important for a given network. Therefore, solutions such as the ones
mentioned previously have been developed to accommodate both cases. Networks requiring
high performance and limited security are more fitting to firewalls performing basic packet
filtering and possibly simple proxies services or NAT. Highly sensitive networks are better
suited to firewalls performing all of the basic functions in addition to more complex operations
such as Stateful Inspection and packet modification. In general, a firewall may be relatively fast
and transparent, or it may be highly secure, but not both.
Another observation about modern firewalls is the aspect of programmability. Firewalls are
highly configurable, but most are not programmable. It is generally not possible for an
administrator to directiy modify the code for a firewall. In some ways this makes sense. Making
modifications to firewall code, especially at the kernel level, could expose holes in the security
framework. However, a lack of programmability makes a firewall highly dependent on the
existing technology, making it highly difficult to add new protocols, new applications, or
company-specific traffic to the secure network. Few modem firewall implementations allow the
ability to modify the firewall in this way.
The Stateful Inspection architecture, used in a number of the more complex firewall
architectures, adds a high level of security to firewall architecture; however, the process of
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inspecting the contents of a packet at all levels of the protocol (Le. to perform user
authentication and connection status monitoring) consumes a great deal of processing time
involvingmemory management and application level processing. Because of these complexities,
Stateful Inspection is obviously not suited for basic packet filtering and circuit level firewalls. It
is for this reason that the latter, more primitive types of firewalls exhibit a lower level of security.
Adding basic state monitoring to packet and circuit level firewalls would improve their security
characteristics, while also mamtaining high performance and transparency.
These comments about the abilities and shortcomings of existing technology are made in
order to demonstrate areas of improvements for firewalls. It will be shown in Section 2.4.2 that
network processors possess unique abilities that will allow such improvements.
2.4 Importance ofNetwork Processors
The network processor is a very recent addition to the arena of networking hardware. This
section describes the forces behind the advent of the network processor, some of their hardware
characteristics and abilities, and their relevance to improving firewall technology.
2.4.1 Emergence ofNetwork Processors
As mentioned several times before, there has been an expansive growth in networking
technology over the last few years. One of the main forces behind this is the nearly exponential
growth of the Internet. High demands on network backbones, especially due to the increased
use of voice and video over the Internet, have made network congestion a serious problem.
Lack of bandwidth is often blamed for such congestion, and the addition of higher-bandwidth
network hardware, such as fiber optics, is often used to solve the problem [12]. However, the
process ofupgrading existing hardware can be an expensive process; therefore, organizations are
now looking for ways to improve the efficiency of their networks, rather than constandy
upgrading systems.
These efficiency problems are usually bottlenecks caused by application servers or routers,
hardware that performs network services such as load balancing, quality of service (QoS)
functionality, gateways, and security (i.e. firewalls). Network processors were developed in order
to improve or to even eliminate these bottlenecks through more efficient utilization of existing
network resources and by providing network services at wire speeds. By offering these
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performance improvements, manufacturers hope that network processors will emerge as the
"building blocks" ofnetworks in the future.
In [12], a network processor is defined as a programmable communications integrated
circuit capable of performing one or more of the following functions: packet classification,
packet modification, queue/policy management, and/or packet forwarding. Packet
classification involves identifying a packet based on a known protocol. Packet modification, as
expected, means making direct changes to a packet's content. An example would be modifying
header fields such as source/destination address or port number in IP or TCP packets
respectively. Queue/policy management deals with the scheduling of packets for specific
applications with respect to the particular design strategy for packet queuing and de-queuing.
Lasdy, packet forwarding is the transmission and receipt of data over a switch fabric and the
forwarding of the packet to the appropriate address. It should be noted that these are just the
basic characteristics of network processors. While they are capable of performing these
functions, their intended power involves the combination of these abilities into higher-level
applications, such as for network security.
As network processors are a growing technology in the communications and Internet
communities, manufacturers are no less than racing to establish a market share. A list of
network processor vendors is provided in Appendix B - Network Processor Vendors. A
majority of these companies are participating in the Network Processor Conference scheduled
for October 23-25, 2001 (NPC 2001) in San Jose, California.
2.4.2 Relevance ofNetwork Processors to Firewall Technology
As described in previous sections, the evolution of firewall technology has made firewalls a
formidable component of network security. However, there is still a sharp trade-off between
network security and performance. Simple packet filter and circuit-level firewalls provide high
speed network traffic filtering, but are completely vulnerable to content related attacks. Just the
opposite is true in the case of more complex firewalls that implement stateful inspection or
kernel level proxying. The high level of security provided by the latter type of systems can cause
bottlenecks in the protected network. These bottlenecks occur because the operations necessary
to ensure a high degree of security require must typically be implemented in software. Network
processors possess a number of characteristics that hold promise for improving the
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performance of existing firewall technologies and also lessening the existing gap between
performance and level of security.
One example is the ability to manipulate packet header information, such as IP source and
destination addresses or transport layer port numbers. This could be used to perform
operations like network address translation at high speeds and would eliminate the need to
reconstruct or copy packets in memory before transmitting the modified packets. Allowing the
firewall to modify the packets in this way would improve the speed and potentially the
transparency of the firewall. In addition, many current firewalls that execute in the application
domain (Le. proxy services) do not have direct access to information contained in low-level
packets. Implementing higher-level firewall concepts (such as proxies) on a network processor
would allow direct packet modification at any point in the protocol stack.
Another important characteristic of network processors is the ability to interpret application
level protocols. This ability typically exists in higher-level firewalls, those that are based on
application level services. Traditionally, giving low-level filters knowledge of application level
information would deteriorate the performance of the firewall (its main benefit, in the case of
low-level firewalls). In the case of network processors, the ability to direcdy observe application
layer packet content combined with wire speed processing rates indicates the potential to
perform application level filtering while maintaining the performance of simple low-level
firewalls. These abilities could be expanded further to include services such as user
authentication and virus detection.
Using the memory capabilities of network processor platforms, it is conceivable that
network processors will also be able to maintain state information on connections that have
occurred across the firewall. This ability could allow network processors to implement concepts
used in stateful inspection firewalls. More importandy, the high speed processing abilities of
network processors will allow these operations to be performed at rates much higher than
traditional stateful inspection systems. As stateful inspection relies on knowledge of application
level information, this potential is also an extension of deep packet processing abilities.
As shown in the previous section, network processors are being developed by a number of
networking manufacturers, each ofwhich provides unique architectural characteristics for their
product. These unique qualities could also provide the ability for firewall performance
improvement. A significant example is an architectural pattern of embedding a certain number
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of packet processors along with special purpose co-processors within the network processor
chip. The presence of multiple processing elements means the ability to explore parallel
processing algorithms. For example, the ability to apply filter rules to a number of packets in
parallel or the ability to pipeline protocol comparisons would significantiy speed-up the firewall.
In summary, network processors allow the standard execution of filtering rules to occur at
hardware speeds, but also offer packet processing and modification capabilities at speeds
typically not available in current firewall solutions. This suggests that network processors are
potential replacements for existing hardware-based firewall implementations such as filtering
routers and application level firewalls. This thesis explores the practicality of implementing
firewalls using the capabilities provided by an example network processor, the IBM PowerNP
4GS3.
2.5 Current Related Research
While firewalls continue to be a fundamental element in providing secure networks, there is
surprisingly little research in the area of firewall technology. This is because
firewalls have
advanced to the point where they are considered one of the basic building blocks of a network.
Rather than focusing on direct improvements to the firewall, researchers are targeting larger
scale topics of network security, using the firewall as a tool for implementation. Several example
topics are described in the following sections, along with implementation possibilities for
network processors
2.5.1 Virus Detection
Virus threats are a problem facing the modem networked community. They can range from
simple annoyances to infections causing devastating system failures. Approaches to vims
detection have traditionally been based on pattern
recognition. Packets or files are scanned for
byte patterns of known viruses, or in more recent systems, are searched for certain characteristic
sub-strings. In both cases, the virus detection algorithm is based on static
characteristics of the
vims [24]. This property makes pattern
recognition a purely reactionary approach. In other
words, the virus detection software reacts
based on previous knowledge, and must be manually
updated to detect a new vims string. Of course, manual updates cannot
occur until after the
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new vims has been introduced, usually on the order of months, most likely after damage has
already been caused. Pattern recognition systems are simply not effective against newly
introduced viruses.
Unfortunately, new viruses will continue to be developed and deployed, but with
continuingly more complex functionality. For this reason, research is being devoted towards the
creation of pro-active systems that will be able to algorithrnically detect and take steps towards
eliminating the virus without direct human intervention. These algorithms are, in most cases,
based on heuristics. However, it is difficult to know how such algorithms will work or what
problems will be caused until they are tested in a real situation. For this reason, it is necessary
for researchers to understand new algorithms from an analytical perspective before anti-virus
solutions are deployed [24].
After a heuristic for virus detection has been developed and simulated, implementation will
become an issue. The modern scenario for virus propagation involves the virus spreading itself
via a large network, such as the Internet. This is often done through mail applications; however,
it is now a greater reality because of the rapid emergence of handheld, mobile data devices,
where anti-virus software has not been completely employed as it has been in the PC industry.
This propagation of viruses over large networks, potentially aided by the existence of mobile
devices, has led to distributed approaches to virus detection. Research in virus detection is
being led by a variety of organizations including anti-virus software manufacturers such as
Symantec, McAfee, and Norton.
Because the firewall is focal point for network traffic, it makes sense that the firewall
machine would be a likely point to implement virus detection. In many cases, the virus is
contained at the application level of packet content, and it is already a feature ofmany modem
firewalls to perform inspection on application layer content. Thus, the firewall is a likely
candidate for the implementation of, or at least a starting point for, vims detection. It should be
remembered, however, that the efficiency of the firewall is a key issue. Algorithmic approaches
to vims detection would undoubtedly affect the speed of the firewall. In addition, the firewall
system would need to have significant processing power in order to perform algorithmic
detection applications. Filtering hardware systems, built entirely for speed would typically not
have this power, and the additional computation added to an application level firewall may cause
a bottleneck.
9/C Matthew E Mariani, June, 2001
Firewall Strategies UsingNetwork Processors ^u
Network processors possess the ability to perform packet inspection, but also have the
ability to perform such inspections at wire speed. It is typically possible to communicate direcdy
with the network processor (Le. network processors have the ability to communicate with
external machines), thus distributed applications could be feasibly implemented using network
processors. Therefore, by combining high rate computational abilities and wire speeds for
packet processing, network processors appear to be a reasonable implementation platform for
implementing virus detection as part of a firewall system.
2.5.2 Virtual Private Networks (VPNs)
Another related area of research is virtual private networks (VPNs). A definition provided
in [10] defines a VPN as a network using encryption and tunneling techniques to connect users
or sites over a public network, typically the Internet. An example of this type of network is
shown below.
Corporate Headquarters
Network
VPN Tunnel
Initiator/Terminator
Encrypted Communication
* m ^rr m
Remote Server ^U jg^ p]
Branch Office Jfe, fS\
Network m
Figure 2.7 - Sample Virtual Private Network
In other words, a VPN is comprised of a physically disjoint
networks or individual machines
separated by an un-trusted network (Le. the Internet). When information from one site is
destined for another, the information is encrypted, transmitted across the un-trusted network,
and decrypted at the target. This technique is known as tunneling.
Like a firewall, the tunnel initiator/terminatormust be the only access point to the protected
network. Because of this, VPN functionality is now being integrated into manymodem firewall
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products. Another similarity to firewalls is that a high dependency exists on the security of the
VPN server. If it is possible to breach the security mechanisms of the server, the cryptographic
encapsulation of transmitting data is relatively useless, as transmissions could still be intercepted.
Adding the encryption functionality used by VPNs into the security operations of the
firewall further strengthens the security of the protected network. However, as with vims
detection, this increase of complexity in the firewall system can lead to a bottleneck in the
network. Network processors are once again a promising solution to implementing VPNs
within the context of a firewall. The implications of network processors to firewalls have
already been described. Many of their architectural features, especially wire speed packet
processing capabilities and programmability, lend themselves naturally to the implementation of
VPN encryption within the context of a firewall.
2.5.3 Intrusion Detection
One conclusion that can be reached from the modern networking environment is that
current security measures, including firewalls, do not guarantee absolute security. For this
reason, additional security measures are being pursued. Intrusion detection has become a
popular field aimed at providing security above and beyond the firewall.
In [2], intrusion detection is defined as the process ofmonitoring the events occurring in a
computer network, analyzing them for signs of security problems. The basic concepts involved
can be extracted from this definition. In order to analyze the
"events" in a network, there must
first exist a system that produces a set of data that describes what is occurring in the network, a
"stream of eventrecords"according to [2]. Next, there must be a portion of the system that
analyzes the data. Finally, a component of the system must react to the data based on the
security policy of the protected network. While this is a rather straightforward description,
implementation is far from trivial (and beyond the scope of this document).
The relevance of firewalls to intrusion detection relates back to the first key aspect of an
intrusion detection system: a source of network event data. As described in 2.1.2, an important
characteristic of a firewall is to perform logging of the network traffic across the firewall. The
firewall log can be a significant source of the data needed by an intrusion detection system.
However, as in the case of the firewall, adding intrusion detection as a security measure for the
network can potentially affect the performance of the
network. The programmability and wire
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speed packet processing abilities of network processors once again seem applicable. A network
processor based firewall would be a high-speed alternative to generating network traffic logs for
an intrusion detection system. In addition to VPNs and vims detection, network processor
based firewalls provide important performance implications to intrusion detection.
2.6 Chapter Summary
This chapter has provided a broad background including the history, present state, and
future of firewalls in the field of network security. As firewalls continue to be a building block
for the secure network, it is important to continue the improvement of firewall technology. It
has been shown that the key issue in firewall implementation is the tradeoff between level of
security and the performance of the network protected by the firewall. Network processors,
because of their unique abilities to perform high-speed packet processing and packet
manipulation, have the potential to lessen this gap between performance and level of security.
The following chapter introduces several strategies for the implementation of firewall systems
on a network processor, using the IBM 4GS3 Network Processor as an example platform.
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Chapter 3
Theory
3.1 Proposed Firewall Improvements
From the information described in the previous chapters, it is clear that there are numerous
characteristics associated with a network processor's architecture that in theory could be used to
enhance the performance of a firewall. This section proposes a set of improvements to firewalls
that are made possible by network processors, using the abilities possessed by the IBM
PowerNP 4GS3 (hereafter referred to as 'NP') as a target architecture.
The first, and foremost, improvement that can be made is in performance. Because
network processors have the ability to process packets at wire speeds, it is logical that simply
implementing a firewall on a network processor, a processor designed specifically for packet
analysis and manipulation, will provide better performance than existing filtering routers or
similar technology based on general purpose processors. For this reason, the first portion of
this study is to create a simple packet filter, the most basic of firewall architectures (see section
3.2).
A second characteristic of network processors that will improve firewall performance is
parallelism available within the processor. Within the core of the NP are multiple instances of
smaller packet processors. When a packet arrives from the network, it is dispatched to one of
the currendy idle processors. Therefore, the NP is capable of processing multiple packets in
parallel. In addition, the NP is a multi-threaded architecture, which further reduces stall cycles
thatmight occur while satisfying instruction dependencies.
An even more significant opportunity for parallelism is provided by the co-processors that
are part of the NP core. For example, in the IBM PowerNP 4GS3 memory accesses are
performed by a specific co-processor. When a memory operation is initiated, the packet
processor may continue performing
operations on the packet while allowing the memory access
to complete. In the case of packet filtering, several memory look-ups must be done for each
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packet that enters the firewall. By overlaying the firewall operations with memory look-ups the
speed of the firewall will improve. These concepts are outlined more specifically in the section
describing the basic NP packet filter (section 3.2).
For a final improvement to firewall performance, a parallel firewall architecture could be
created using a combination ofmultiple network processors. A theoretical model of a parallel
firewall architecture, obtained from [3], is shown below.
Figure 3.1 - Parallel FirewallModel
In the parallel firewall model, packets traveling between the internal network and the external
network view the parallel firewall as a single entity (Le. one line in, one line out). However, the
work of packet filtering is shared between the individual machines within the parallel firewall.
While figure 3.1 shows the firewall machines as individual workstations, these could be
implemented using network processors. A second benefit of this architecture is that it provides
redundancy to the firewall in the event that one firewall machines crashes or goes offline. If a
crash is detected, the remaining firewall machines could be instructed to perform the packet
filtering typically done by the failed machine. In this configuration, the network processors
share the load of packet filtering with the purpose of lowering the possibility of a bottleneck
caused by the firewall while also providing a degree of transparency in the event that one of the
firewall machines is removed from the network. An approach to implementing a parallel
firewall using network processors is described further in section 3.3.
3.2 Basic NP Packet Filter
The method of packet filtering is a traditional approach to firewall implementation. As
discussed earlier, packets are permitted to pass through the firewall based on a set of
properties that define the firewall's security policy, the firewall
"rule." The diagram below
shows the basic elements of a firewall system utilizing a network processor. As shown, the
3-1 Matthew E Mariani, June, 2001
Firewall Strategies UsingNetwork Processors -* *
firewall is composed of a network processor that performs the filtering operations, and a
control point system that allows user management of the network processor. An important
requirement is that the firewall must be the single point of access to the protected network.
Control Point
Workstation
gggSgZv
m fcC-vc
External Network
(i e Internet Connection)
NP Firewall
Protected Network
Figure 3.2 - Basic NP Firewall
There exist two basic approaches to developing a firewall rule. The firewall can either a.)
permit all network traffic unless it is explicidy denied by the rule or b.) deny all traffic unless it
is explicidy permitted by the rule. It should be reminded that the first option is inherendy less
safe than the second, as the default action is to permit traffic to pass through the firewall.
This clearly increases the set of potential security violations.
The firewall rule can be based upon a number of properties pertaining to the network
traffic. It is important to first verify the protocols being used by network traffic. This becomes
the first condition when defining a firewall rule. In the Internet, the protocols of choice are IP
for routing and TCP for transport layer functionality. The firewalls designed for this project are
based on this premise. The relevant properties used for defining the firewall rule are the IP
source and destination address and the TCP source and destination port numbers. This
information is readily available from the IP and TCP headers.
When designing the firewall for the network processor, several issues must be addressed. A
method must be designed for modeling a firewall rule. Then, the complete rule will be
composed of a set of individual rules for defining specific IP and TCP traffic that is permitted to
pass through the firewall. The complete rule can be conceptualized as a table of the individual
rules. Because the latency caused by the firewall application must be minimized, the latency in
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traversing the rule table should also be minimized. This becomes especially true when
considering that multiple look-ups must be performed for each packet (for the IP source
address, IP destination address, TCP source port, and TCP destination port). If a traditional list
or array structure was used, the latency in performing a rule would be 0(N). A more desirable
structure for mamtaining the firewall rules would be a tree structure, one ofOdog N).
The NP being used for this project, in fact, possesses a memory architecture that is
organized around maintaining data structures as trees. For every element that is placed in the
tree, an associated key must be given. When attempting to look-up a data element, a search key
is generated and then used by the branch nodes to perform comparisons with the keys
associated with the leaf data.
Branch Control
Block (To Other Tree Data)
Key Key
Data Data
Leaf Data LeafData
Figure 3.3 - GenericNP Tree Structure
This brings up the concept of two types of search algorithms
provided by the NP hardware to
traverse the tree: Longest Prefix Match (LPM) and FPM (Full Pattern Match). In an LPM
search, the leaf keywith longest sequence ofmatching bits is returned for a given search key.
LPM Example:
Two leaves with keys 0x12 and 0x1234 respectively
Suppose the following searches:
Search Key: 0x1299 returns leafwith key 0x12
Search Key: 0x1234 returns leafwith key 0x1234
Search Key: 0x1 returns no leaf
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The FPM search has a more obvious behavior - a leaf is returned by the search when the search
key exactmatches the bits in the leaf key (stated alternatively, the bit pattern of the leaf key fully
matched the bit pattern of the search key).
FPM Example:
Two leaves with keys 0x12 and 0x1234 respectively
Suppose the following searches:
Search Key: 0x1299 returns no leaf
Search Key: 0x1234 returns leafwith key 0x1234
Search Key: 0x1 returns no leaf
Branch Control
Block
Key: 0x12 Key 0x1234
Data Data
These two types of search algorithms relate direcdy to the data searches thatwould be made
when attempting to look up IP and TCP rules for firewalls. In IP filters, it is often desirable to
filter packets destined to a particular network, for example anything on the 129.21.xx.xx. It
would require approximately
216 individual rules to filter packets destined for any IP address on
that network, given a standard IPv4 32-bit network address. By filtering on just the upper 16
bits of the IP address, this filter can be express as a single rule. This is exacdy the purpose of
the LPM search. By matching a key based on the upper portion of a subnet address, all of the
specific, full length IP address can be filtered. Filters on specific IP address on the given subnet
may be removed by adding individual permissive rules thereafter.
TCP filters on the other hand are based on specific port numbers. An additional implication
is that the packet is actually a TCP packet. In other words, the firewall rule is based not just on
the port number, but also the protocol type. It is possible that other transport protocols, such
as UDP, may be used on the network that share a TCP port number with another application.
For this reason, the filter rule must match both the protocol and the port number. This
characteristic of exactmatching implies usage of an FPM search on the network processor. The
specific details of the implication of the IP LPM rule tree and the transport FPM rule tree are
discussed in detail in section 4.2.
Another important piece of information that must be mentioned is that tree searches on the
NP are performed using special purpose co-processors. After a search key has been generated,
the tree search (Le. memory search) may be issued to the co-processor allowing the packet
Firewall Strategies UsingNetwork Processors 34 Matthew E Mariani, June, 2001
processor to continue processing of either the packet information, or preparation for the next
firewall rule look up (again, multiple look-ups are needed for each packet). Below is a flowchart
outlining an algorithm for performing the firewall rule look-up that demonstrates usage of
parallelism in the NP.
Ethernet Packet
Enters System
Discard Packet
Discard Packet
Packet Enters Ingress
Data Store ofNP
I
Extract IP
Destination Address
V
Build IP
Destination Key
1 "
Build IP
Source Key
Execute LPM Tree Search
For IP Firewall Rule
\ >
Yes
1 ' "
Build TCP
Source Key
Execute LPM Tree Search
For IP Firewall Rule
1 '
(Perform TCP Filter and Routing Code)
Figure 3.4 - Packet FilterAlgorithm (IP Portion)
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(TCP Source Key Previously Constructed - see previous diagram)
Discard Packet
1
Execute FPM Tree Search
For TCP Firewall Rule
Execute FPM Tree Search
For TCP Firewall Rule
Discard Packet
(Continue Routing Packet)
Figure 3.5 - Packet Filter Algorithm (TCP Portion)
This algorithm uses parallelism by overlapping the creation of search trees keys with the look up
of firewall rules. Utilizing the tree method of data storage provided by the NP along with the
parallelism that is made available during tree look-ups by the memory co-processor suggests
significant performance benefits to the firewall.
It is also necessary to determine a data format for the representation of a rule element in the
table. Next, the network processor provides a variety ofmemory options. Memory usage (i.e.
the type ofmemory - DRAM, SRAM, etc) and associated memory properties will also affect the
latency of the firewall. Lasdy, the rule table should be managed in such a way that rules may be
added or deleted in a simple fashion. All of these issues must be addressed; however, they are
more appropriately discussed in terms of specific implementation details, as described in section
4.1.
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3.3 Parallel Packet Filter
One of the key drawbacks to using a firewall is the potential for causing a bottleneck in the
network. Consider the basic packet filtering algorithm described in the previous section. In
order to perform the most basic of firewall activities, four memory accesses are necessary.
Memory accesses are extremely costiy to the performance of a high speed processor, and
henceforth to the firewall. Therefore, attempting to distribute the load of the filtering
operations, as depicted by the parallel firewall model in figure 3.1, can potentially lessen the
potential for causing a bottleneck.
While the parallel firewall model at first appears to be a simple architecture, there are a
number of realistic complications that occur in its design. Most of these complications are due
to constraints caused by standard protocols used by the Internet. To begin, in order for a
firewall to transmit packets from one side of the network to the other, itmust have some notion
of routing. It can be assumed that the packet filter being conceptualized for the firewall is also a
router, or an example of the so-called filtering routers that have been mentioned previously in
this document. It is typical for standard IP routers to have a designated IP address on both the
internal and external side of the network. Hosts on the internal network are configuredwith the
address of the router on their network so that packets can be routed to the external network (Le.
the Internet). The same would be true for a firewall. When a packet on the network must be
routed to the external side of the firewall/router, the firewall/routermust communicate with the
host transmitting the packet. In order to do this, it is necessary for the router and the host to
communicate at Layer 2 of the network protocol stack (the Datalink layer - used to provide
error correction during data transmission.). One of the most common Layer 2 standards is
Ethernet, which makes use of the Address Resolution Protocol (ARP). This protocol involves a
direct mapping between the hardware-assigned ARP address of a network card and its
configured IP address. As stated previously, the router interface (on either side of the network)
is configured with an IP address that allows the router to respond to ARP requests from one of
the network hosts. The parallel firewall diagram shown in Figure 3.1, however, violates this
single interface model to some degree because the firewall/router has three connections to the
network (via a hub), which implies the need for three LP addresses and therefore three ARP
addresses. The fundamental problem that thus occurs is how to resolve the problem ofnetwork
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hosts attempting to send data to, conceptually, a single firewall/router interface, and having
multiple router/firewall interfaces arbitrate the request for data transmission over ARP.
There are several solutions to this problem. One solution is to program the hosts to
alternate the address to which they send outgoing packets. This of course means adding a
workload to the host machine, and therefore a reduction in the apparent performance of the
network. More importandy, this would require a modification to the operating system of each
host on the network. These two drawbacks cleariy make this solution a poor alternative for
implementing a parallel firewall.
A second solution is to configure each of the firewall/router machines with the same
network address and synchronize the parallel machines "taking turns" in responding to a packet
transmission and performing the subsequent filtering rules. In order to do this, a means of
communication is required between the parallel machines is required. This synchronization;
however, would be a relatively complicated process and would lower the performance of the
firewall. This would be especially true if the inter-machine communication occurred on the
target networks at a level that would cause additional network contention. A second obstacle to
this architecture is that direct modification to the system executing the Layer 2 communication
might be necessary. This processing is often done by the network interface card hardware,
making it difficult, if not impossible, to modify. In reality, a network processor would be
capable of coordinating this type of architecture, because Layer 2 protocols may be
implemented on a network processor, and therefore be modified at the assembly code level.
However, given the difficulty of coordinating the inter-machine synchronization, the following
architecture is more practical in terms of implementation.
A final architecture, the one implemented for the purposes of this thesis, follows the model
of a single interface to the firewall/router. This is done by adding an additional machine that
acts as the single interface to the firewall/router. This machine is then responsible for
performing a simple switching operation between the parallel firewall machines (see figure 3.6
on the following page).
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Figure 3.6 - Switch-based Parallel Firewall
In this architecture, network hosts are configured to send traffic to the switch NP. Packets
passing through the switch are directed to one of the firewall/router machines, which then
performs the more time-consuming packet filtering operations. A simple algorithm would be to
alternate between the two firewall/router machines. As can be seen, the switch adds a second
hop to the firewall/router. Therefore, the speed of the switching machine must be fast enough
to not outweigh the performance benefit achieved by sharing the load of packet filtering
provided by the parallelism of the firewall/router machines. A network processor is capable of
performing this type of switching operation at extremely high speeds.
This architecture possesses two additional characteristics that are worthy ofmention. First,
the synchronization that would be required in the previous architecture is no longer necessary
because the arbitration of packet processing is centralized in the switching machine. This also
avoids amount of network added by the parallel firewall system. Secondly, this architecture is
capable of providing the redundancy mentioned in section 3.1. In the event one of the firewall
machines fails, the switch can begin directing network traffic to one of the remaining
firewall/router machines. On the other hand, this firewall relies on the switch being online at all
times. The specific implementation of this firewall is described in section 4.3.
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3.4 Chapter Summary
Network processors provide a wide range of functionality that can be used in firewall
applications. While they can be used to implement simple packet-filters, network processors can
also be used as building blocks for complex firewall architectures, such as the parallel firewall.
The next chapter describes the specific implementation details of a basic NP packet filter and a
parallel firewall system using the architectures described in the previous two sections. These
implementations illustrate the usage of the high-speed packet processing abilities and advanced
architectural features, including tree-based memory structures and parallelism provided by co
processors, provided by the IBM PowerNP 4GS3.
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Chapter 4
Implementation
4.1 Development Environment
Before discussing the details of the two NP firewalls that were developed, a brief description
of the development environment should be made. To begin, applications for the IBM
PowerNP 4GS3 network processor (referred to hereafter as "NP") are developed in two parts:
the actual NP assembly code, termed
"picocode,"
and the application management control
software, termed the control-point. The diagram below depicts an NP system with an external
control point machine. In reality, the control point could be implemented on a different
platform, such as an embedded PowerPC core residing on the NP die.
Control
Messages
A
Control Point
. -mAZ t
Network Traffic
?
Network
Processor
Figure 4.1 - NP System Diagram
The firewall applications were created using IBM's Advance Software Offering (ASO) for the
PowerNP 4GS3. This package, targeted for Linux V6.1, includes a suite of code development
tools in addition to a router application implemented on a simulated NP. The following are
primary components included in the package:
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1. NPAssembler (npasm)- Compiler for PowerNP 4GS3 picocode.
2. NPScope (npscope) - Debugger application used to test picococde and test memory structures, such
as the tree structures discussed in the previous chapter.
3. NP Simulator (npsim)- Linux application that simulates a network processor blade with an attached
40-port Ethernet board.
4. NP Router Picocode - A complete set ofboot and application picocode that gives the NP full dynamic
routing capabilities when used in conjunction with an external control point system.
5. NP Control Point (npcp) A control point application, implemented in C, used to manage the NP
router application.
6. NP ControlPoint Console (npcp console) - A simple text-based user interface to npcp.
7. GateD Public Release 3.6 (see wnw.nextbop.com) - Linux application that manages OSPF routing tables, used in
conjunction with theNP routing application
The simulated router application provided by the ASO was used as the basis for the firewalls
developed using the NP. In order for a firewall to transmit packets, it must have at least some
basic level of routing capabilities. Therefore, the packet forwarding abilities provided by the
router application served as a perfect starting point to begin adding firewall functionality. Thus,
the approach taken for this project was to create a firewall by upgrading the abilities of the
existing routing application to include packet-filtering capabilities.
4.2 Basic Packet Filter
As discussed in section 3.2, the purpose of the basic NP packet filter was to utilize the tree
method of data storage provided by the NP along with the parallelism that is made available
during tree look-ups by the memory co-processor. In order to do this, it was necessary to
design a memory scheme for managing the IP and transport firewall rule tables and add code to
the existing routing application picocode and control point code for the purpose of managing
the firewall data structures.
4.2.1 NP Hardware Tree Management
While the NP does in fact manage tables as logical tree structures, the hardware
representation is somewhat more complex. In the NP hardware, all data elements are
maintained as leaves, and branching information is stored in node structures called PSCBs
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(Pattern Search Control Blocks). The PSCBs are then accessed by a hashing table, (called DTs -
Direct Tables) in order to improve efficiency. Each DT entry points to a unique PSCB. An
example is shown below.
I,eaf Data
PSCB
LeafData
DT
Figure 4.2 - NP Tree Structure Hardware Model
Thus, when defining a tree structure, it is necessary to allocate memory resources for the
DTs, PSCBs, and leaves. There are a variety of different memory resources available, which
range in terms of data width and speed. After declaration, DTs and PSCBs are fixed in size;
however, the quantity and size of leaf structures will depend on the application executes.
Obviously, memory must be allocated in order to store all of the necessary leaves. The specific
memory allocation for the firewall rules is described in the following section.
4.2.2 IP Firewall Rule Tree Structures Design
Section 3.2 introduced the concepts relating to the tree managed data structures provided by
the NP. It was decided to implement filtering in the basic NP firewall based on IP (Internet
Protocol) source and destination address and transport layer source and destination port for and
TCP (Transport Control Protocol) and UDP (User Datagram Protocol).
As mentioned previously, it is often desirable for an IP filter to filter packets at the network
level rather than on specific IP address. This functionality is well suited for the Longest Prefix
Match (LPM) tree structure provided by the NP. In order to implement an LPM tree for
managing the IP firewall rules, it was necessary to create a memory scheme (a combination of
key/leaf objects) for accessing the rule information contained in the trees at leaf nodes. Because
Internet traffic is guaranteed to use the IP protocol, the key for accessing the firewall rule table
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was based entirely on the IP address. For reference, an IPv4 (Internet Protocol Version 4)
address is represented in the form AA.BB.CC.DD, where each of the four portions of the
address may be a number from 0 - 255. This address is stored and transmitted as a 32 bit
integer according to the equation:
Equation 4.1 - Integer Value of IP Address = (AA 24) | (BB 16) | (CC 8) | (DD)
The integer value can then be used direcdy as a key for the LPM search used to index into the
IP rule table. Refer to figure 3.3 for a diagram of the tree structure. Below is an outline of the
memory design process.
ImportantNotes:
An IP rule depends on either the IP source or destination field, the respective IP net mask,
and the number of bits from the net mask that are used as part of the key (prefix length).
It is useful to work with the parameters on a byte by byte basis
It is a hardware requirement for the key to be a multiple of 16 bits - the IP address is 32 bits
so this is not a problem
The data leaf includes all information including a copy of the data used to build the search
key.
Control overhead for the leaves is 5 bytes
IP Rule Leaf Structure
Key Bytes:
Field:
IP net: aabb.cc.dd - 4 Bytes
LeafData:
Field:
Control (Used by NP hardware to manage the order ofelem ents in the tree) : 5 Bytes
Signature (Identifies the Control Point that created the rule): 1 Byte
IP net (Copy ofthe key): 4 Bytes
Prefix Length (Numberofbits ofthe key used to perform the LPM look-up): 1 Byte
Source Rule (Action to perform ifthe IP net isfrom the sourcefield ofa packet): 1 Byte
Destination Rule (Action to perform ifthe IP net isfrom the destination field ofa packet): 1 Byte
Key IP Network Mask
Leaf Control
Control 1 Signature Key(3:2]
Key(1:0] Prefix Length Source Rule
Dest. Rule
Byte Codesfor 'Source Rule' and 'Destination
Rule' Fields:
Firewall Action:
Permit = 0x00
Deny = 0x01
Summary:
Control Overhead - 5 Bytes
Key - 4 Bytes
Leaf Data - 8 Bytes
Total: 17 Bytes = 136 Bits
This detailed byte information is necessary for allocating memory blocks within the network
processor. In the PowerNP 4GS3, memory allocation is highly dependent on the dimensions
(width and height) of the memory block being used. For example, DRAM was chosen for the
firewall rules because of the size of the module. The firewall rule list could potentially grow to a
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large size; therefore, causing memory overflow. The NP possesses four DRAM modules each
with four banks. Most of these modules are 64 bits wide. Each IP rule leaf structure, shown
above, uses a total of 17 bytes or 136 bits, which implies three DRAM banks. Thus, the
memory allocation for IP rule leaves was a width of three and a height of one. Several example
leaf structures are shown below.
Example Rule #1:
"Deny any packet destined for the 129.21.26.139 address"
This implies a prefix length of 32 bits = 0x20 =>
Key: 0x81 151 A8B = (129 24) | (21 16) | (26 8) | (139) using Equation 4.1
LeafData, excluding hardware control bits (suppose Signature = 0x01): 0x0181 151A8B200001
Example IP Rule LeafStructure (see previous page)
Key 0x81151A8B
Leaf Control
Control 1 0x01 0x8115
0x1A8B 0x20 0x00
0x01 | un-used un-used un-used
Example Rule #2:
"Deny any packet originating from the 207.46.xx.xx network"
This implies a prefix length of 16 bits = 0x10 =>
Key: 0xCF2E000O = (207 24) | (46 16) | (0 8) | (0) using Equation 4.1
LeafData, excluding hardware control bits (suppose Signature = 0x01): Ox01CF2E0000100100
Example IP Rule LeafStructure (see previous page)
Key 0xCF2E0000
Leaf Control
Control 1 0x01 0xCF2E
0x0000 0x10 I 0x01
0x00 | un-used un-used un-used
4.2.3 Transport Firewall Rule Tree Structures Design
The design of the transport rule tree structure occurred very similady to that of the IP rule
tree. Similar to IP rules, transport rules are based on source and destination port numbers. This
is particularly applicable to TCP and UDP, two of the most common protocols used on the
Internet. One difference, however, is that the Internet packets are not guaranteed to utilize a
specific transport protocol, if any. Therefore, a transport rule is dependent on both the port
number and the protocol. Contrary to the IP rules, the port numbers and protocols used as part
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of the transport rule must match exacdy. This implied the use of a second rule table within the
basic NP firewall, an FPM (full pattern match - see section 3.3) based tree.
The design for the transport tree memory occurred in a similar fashion to the IP rule tree.
As stated, a transport rule is dependent on the specific protocol and port number. Therefore,
the key used to index the transport rule tree also had to be based on these two properties. Once
again, it was convenient to manage data structures on a byte-by-byte basis. Therefore, the key
structure used for this tree was a concatenation of a one-byte protocol code and the two-byte
port number to be filtered.
Transport Rule Key: Protocol Code Port Number
Figure 4.3 - Transport Rule Key
Below is an outline of the memory design process.
Important Notes:
An transport rule depends on both the protocol and port number.
Filter rules will be permitted for TCP and UDP packets
It is useful to work with the parameters on a byte by byte basis
It is a hardware requirement for the key to be a multiple of 16 bits; therefore, a pad of 1 byte
is required
The data leaf includes all information including a copy of the data used to build the search
key.
Control overhead for the leaves is 5 bytes
Key Pad | Procotol Code | Port Number
Leaf Control
Control j Signature Key(3 2]
KeyilO] Source Rule | Dest Rule
Transport Rule LeafStructure
Key Bytes:
Field:
Pad = 0x00 - 1 Byte
Protocol Code - 1 Byte
Port Number - 2 Bytes
LeafData:
Field:
Control (Used by NP hardware to manage the order ofelemems in the tree) : 5 Bytes
Signature (Identifies the Control Point that created the rule): 1 Byte
Key (Copy ofthe key): 4 Bytes
Source Port Rule (Action toperform ifthe keymatches theprotocol and sourceport ofa packet): 1 Byte
Destination Port Ru\e (Action toperform ifthe keymatches theprotocol and destination port ofa packet): 1 Byte
Byte Codes for 'Source Rule' and 'Destination
Rule' Fields:
Firewall Action:
Permit = 0x00
Deny = 0x01
IP Protocol Field Codes for Transport Layer Protocols:
TCP = 0x06
UDP = 0x11
Only TCP and UDP are supported in this design, see RFC 1 700for afull list
Summary:
Control Overhead - 5 Bytes
Key - 4 Bytes
Leaf Data - 8 Bytes
Total: 16 Bytes = 128 Bits
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DRAM was chosen for the transport rule table as well, for the same reasoning used for the
IP rule table (the size of the module). Again, the typical DRAM module is 64 bits wide. Each
transport rule leaf structure, shown above, uses a total of 16 bytes or 128 bits, which implies
exactly two DRAM banks are necessary. Thus, the memory allocation for transport rule table
was a width of two and a height of one. Several example leaf structures are shown below.
Example Rule #J :
"Deny any packet originating from TCP port 23 (telnet)"
This implies a protocol code of 0x06 for TCP and a port number of 23 = 0x17 =>
Key: 0x00060017
Leaf Data, excluding hardware control bits (suppose Signature = 0x01): 0x01000600170100
Example Transport Rule Leaf Structure (see previous page)
Key 0x00 0x06 0x0017
Leaf Control
Control 0x01 0x0006
0x0017 0x01 0x00
This completed the memory design process for the data structures used to manage the firewall
rules.
4.2.4 Test Procedure
With the completion of the firewall rule data structures, filtering code (see figure 3.) was
then added to the existing router application provided by LBM, as described in section 4.1. A
test network using simulated NPs was then created, and the firewall was then tested using a
series of Internet operations.
4.2.4.1 Software Components
The IBM routing software consists of control point software and assembly code executed
on the NP. Code additions were necessary in both. The control point was used to declare the
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memory dimensions required for the IP and transport firewall rule tables. These declarations
were forwarded to the NP and used to allocate the appropriate memory blocks. The control
point was also the focal point for adding and manipulating the rules contained on the firewall.
This was done by adding firewall options to a text based user interface provided by IBM (the
npcp_console application). The firewall interface is shown on the following page.
Console Prompt:
logout
set
show
trace
firewall
>P
add (Adds an IPfilter)
<net mask (format aa.bb.cc.dd)> <prefL\ length> <source rule> destination rule>
query (Checks the valuesfor an IPfilter on the NP)
<net mask (format aa.bb.cc.dd)> <prefix length>
delete (Deletes an IPfilter)
<netmask (format aa.bb.cc.dd)> <prefix length>
update (Updates the sourceI'destination rule oj an IP'filter)
<netmask (format aa.bb.cc.dd)> <prefix length>
list (Lists the statistics ofIP rules in the system)
transport
add (Adds a transport layerfilter)^
tcP
<port number> <source rule> <destination rule>
-udp
<port number> <source rule> <destination rule>
query (Checks the valuesfora transport layer filter on theNP)
- tcp
<port number>
-udp
<port number>
- delete (Deletes a transport layer filter)
tcp
<port number>
-udp
<port number>
- update (Updates the source/destination rule ofa transportfilter)
tcp
<port number>
-udp
<poit number>
list (Lists the statistics oftransport rules in the system)
load_rule_file (Loads a set ofpre-defined rulesfrom afile, using the abate
format used to
'add'
afirewall rule)
<filename> (i.e. /etc/npcp.d/frrewall.conf)
. - Matthew E. Madani, June, 2001
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4.2.4.2 Test Environment
The test environment for the basic NP firewall is shown on the following page. As can be
seen, the test network was comprised of five systems, including one for executing the simulated
NP firewall code, three hosts for performing Internet operations, one for performing network
address translation (NAT) in order to hide the false internal IP addresses.
Simulated
Firewall
f&\ (Hub)
in.
Host TIT
10.1.10.241 10.1.20.241
'fm\ fS&\ pL1] pj]
B&~ j ss.
Host 'CE1 ' Host 'IT2' Host m Host 'CE2'
129.21.26138 10.1.10 240 10.1.20.242 10.1.20.243 10.1.20 244
NAT Miichine Host Machines
Figure 4.4 - BasicNP FirewallTestNetwork
Machine Name
(see figure 4.4 Above)
OS CPU Memory
IT1 Linux 6.1 Pentium II - 300MHz 128MB
IT2 Linux 6.1 Pentium- 166 MHz 64MB
IT3 Linux 6.1 Pentium -166 MHz 64MB
CE1 Linux 6.1 AMD K6 - 500 MHz 96 MB
CE2 Linux 6.1 Pentium- 166 MHz 64MB
Table 4.1 - Basic NP Firewall NetworkMachine Descriptions
In order to test the NP, a series of Internet applications were executed from the three host
machines on the network. These applications included loading a web page from a Netscape
browser, performing FTP and telnet operations, and using the America Online Instant
Messenger chat program. Firewall rules were added to the systems at random in order to
block network traffic originating from these applications. The firewall was found to work
successfully.
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4.3 Parallel Packet Filter
The parallel packet filter that was implemented followed the architecture described in
section 3.3. As shown in figure 3.6, this architecture is comprised of one switch NP that serves
as the interface to the firewall, and two firewall NPs that share the load of filtering packets.
4.3.1 Switch Design
The switch used in this parallel firewall architecture is conceptually a straightforward entity.
The switch must process all packets that travel across the firewall, and the switch must balance
the network traffic load between the two firewallmachines.
The first issue that arose was the matter of avoiding
"circular"
packet routing. According to
the diagram, suppose a packet, destined for the Internet, was sent by the internal host.
A
(Loed-Baiorerg
Swtlch) c
CUgiii'q
Tteifc
Hjb
t
~IST
It * 1
l j IrcofinB
TmircUmSS
Prrftded Nrlwu-k
\
VSI)
HJD
*7 s / =1\ U^lI cRcuter.Fire M i- "v" /
1 J 1
Ineos-i'io
traffic
B Outr
Tro ftIC
E1etr>3( Network
' (i c. irtcnd Crnnecitcn)
Figure 4.4 - Parallel Firewall Diagram (Highlighted)
This packet would be visible to the switch on the network at point A'. This packet would be
forwarded by the switch to one of the firewall nodes, for example the leftmost firewall machine,
and would appear on the external network (if permitted) at point
rB.' This (identical) packet
would also be visible to the switch at point 'C on the network, and would therefore be
forwarded by the switch a second time. This process would obviously repeat until the network
would become completely congestedwith packet traffic. The switch code, therefore, needed the
ability to distinguish between the direction of the packet (direction across the firewall) and the
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port at which the packet arrived. The port of arrival could easily be extracted from the control
information provided by the NP hardware. The direction of the packet could be determined
from the IP address information. The flowchart below outlines the algorithm performed by the
NP switch code.
Process the Packet
Forward Packet to the Current Firewall Node
Figure 4.5 - Parallel Firewall SwitchAlgorithm Flowchart
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The next step in the design of the switch was the algorithm for sending packets to the two
firewall nodes. For this implementation a simple rotating scheme was chosen. Suppose there
were
'n' firewall machines attached to the switch for the purpose of sharing the firewall load.
Each firewall node would be connected to the switch via its network, lO.l.n.O, at an address of
10.1.n.242, where 242 is a randomly chosen, but fixed, value for all of the firewall nodes (see
diagram below).
10.1.0.0
Network
Switch
lO.l.n.O
Network
10.1.0.242 10.1.1.242 10.1.n.242
Firewall Node Firewall Node Firewall Node
Read Current NetworkValue
(i.e Y, Beginning with 0)
I
Send the packet to the
current node at
lO.l.x.242
I
If(current node == 'n' )
next = 0
else
next = current + 1
I
Save the Value of
the Next Node
Figure 4.6 - Network Switching Scheme
The switch then rotates through each firewall node, in a round-robin fashion, sending packets
for filter processing.
4.3.2 Firewall Node Design
A goal of the parallel firewall was to utilize the basic NP packet filter designed as described
in section 4.2. The only additional code required was to only accept packets that enter the
firewall system from the port attached to the firewall switch. This was simply a matter of
checking the incoming port number, provided by the NP hardware, before continuing packet
processing.
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4.3.3 Test Procedure
Because the parallel firewall was intended to appear identical in behavior to the basic NP
packet filter, the testing strategywas essentially the same. As done for the basic NP packet filter,
this implementation was modeled using the IBM PowerNP 4GS3 simulator in a Linux
environment. Below is the test network that was used.
Simulated
Firewall Switch
10.1 .10.0 Network
(to Internet) (Hub)
NAT Machine
Bra 1
ALz_~-.
Host'CEV
129.21.26.138 10.1.10.240
Hosnrr j-j&S^
10.1 .20.0 Network
10.1 .0.0 Network
Host 'IT2'
Simulated
Firewall %
tear "
. IB - -
10.1 .1.0Network
| Host TO
tare* 11
p'| Simulated
f Firewall
(Hub)
Host 'CE2'
10 1.20.244
Host Machine
Figure 4.7 - Parallel FirewallTestNetwork
It can be seen from the diagram that the test network consisted of the three NP simulators
already mentioned in addition to a single host used to perform various communications across
the firewall and, once again, a network address translation (NAT) machine between the test
network and the outside work. The systems used were the same used for the basic NP packet
filter (see Table 4.1). In order to test the parallel NP, the same set of Internet applications were
executed from the three host machines on the network. These applications included loading a
web page from a Netscape browser, performing FTP and telnet operations, and using the
America Online Instant Messenger chat program. Firewall rules were added to the firewall
nodes using the user interface described in section 4.2.4.2. The following user interface was
provided in order to manipulate the firewall switch.
Firewall Strategies UsingNetwork Processors 53
Matthew E Mariani, June, 2001
Console Prompt:
logout
set
show
trace
firewall
switch
auto (instructs the switch use all branches)
assigned (instructs the switch to use a single node branch (0. . .n))
The switch was tested by running it in both the automatic and assigned branch configurations.
This was done to show that the switch could be used to redirect network traffic through a
specific node in the event that one of the firewall nodes went offline. All of these tests were
found run successfully for the test parallel firewall network.
4.4 Results Analysis
After successfully testing the two firewall architectures in the simulated environment, it was
clear that the NP provided effective means for implementing a firewall. The tree management
hardware provided by the IBM PowerNP 4GS3 was necessary in order to provide an improved
data model, supported by high-speed hardware, for storing firewall rules. While tree structures
can support a large number of applications, the longest prefix match (LPM) and full pattern
match (FPM) tree search capabilities were particularly applicable to filtering existing protocols,
including IP, TCP and UDP. In addition, by utilizing the co-processors available in the NP for
issuing tree memory searches, a high degree of parallelism was achieved.
While parallelism was used to improve the performance of the firewall algorithm, memory
accesses still caused the most significant delay in the execution of the packet filter. Network
processors typically possess a variety ofmemory modules, such as the DRAM modules used for
storing the IP and transport firewall rules. One possible improvement that could be made to
the basic packet filter architecture would be to utilize a faster memory, for example internal
network processor memory. The trade-off for using the faster memory would be a constraint in
the size of the firewall rule table. In many real world applications, it is possible that the firewall
could grow to exceed the size of memory available internally to the network processor. One
possible way to lower the size of the firewall rule table,
in order to meet internal memory
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constraints, would be to condense the structures used in storing the individual firewall rules.
For example, many of the flags and key structures used in the IP and transport firewall rule
tables for this implementation used byte codes. These rules could have been condensed to bit-
sized flags in order to conserve memory. However, condensing or packing bits in this fashion
would also increase the complexity of the firewall algorithm. Naturally, this would imply a
slower firewall. In summary, a compromise must be found between the memory used, the
structure of the firewall rules, and the algorithm for performing packet filtering.
The parallel firewall was, of course, also shown to be a feasible method for implementing a
firewall using the NP. However, like the basic NP packet filter, a variety of trade-offs must be
considered when implementing a parallel firewall architecture. For example, adding a switch to
the parallel architecture adds a second hop for network traffic to travel. A second hop implies
an added latency in executing the filtering rules. It is therefore essential that the switch
mechanism, or any such packet switching algorithm that divides the filtering work among the
parallel firewall machines, must provide a minimal latency with respect to the total time
necessary to perform the filter rules. The IBM PowerNP 4GS3 is designed to work in
conjunction with other network processors over a high-speed, custom-designed switch fabric.
This type of high-speed communication media would be extremely significant in improving the
performance of a parallel firewall by rninirnizing switching time. Another, less significant,
drawback of a parallel firewall is that it requires more IP address than a standard firewall.
Assume a typical firewall has one interface to the internal network and a second interface to the
external network. The parallel firewall requires two interfaces at the switch, but also an addition
two interfaces for each parallel firewall rule used. Thus, the number of IP addresses consumed
by a parallel firewall of
'n'
parallel firewall nodes would grow according to the formula below:
Equation 4.2 - Number of IP Address = 2 + 2n = 0(N).
This is significant because the quantity of available 32-bit IP addressers available to modem
industry is rapidly declining. The consumption of such IP addresses could potentially be costly
to the user of the parallel firewall.
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4.5 Chapter Summary
The two firewall schemes thatwere implemented provided a detailed look into the
architectural capabilities of the IBM PowerNP 4GS3, as they related to firewall. The tree search
mechanisms and co-processors provided an excellent framework for improving performance
and utilizing parallelism in the implementation ofpacket filtering firewalls. While these
mechanisms were effective, itwas also clear that performance trade-offs existed for virtually all
design decisions that were made. These trade-offs include compromises in memory
configurations used and even the physical properties of the network. In summary, while the NP
is an apparendy beneficial architecture for firewall technology, the door for future exploration of
and improvement to firewalls has only just been opened. The following chapter provides some
additions summarizations and several ideas for future work with the IBM PowerNP 4GS3 and
firewall strategies.
C/: Matthew E Mariani, June, 2001
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
5.1 Summary ofWork
The work performed in this study provided a solid foundation to many of the issues
involved in using a network processor as a platform for the implementation of a basic firewall
system. To begin, it was apparent that the memory architecture of the network processor plays
a significant role in the design of the firewall system. This was evident in the case of the IBM
PowerNP 4GS3 in relation to the use ofLPM and FPM tree structures for firewall rules and the
necessity to balance the size of the firewall table with the capacity and speed of a particular
memory module.
Parallelism was a second issue involved throughout both of the firewall implementations
that were developed. Parallelism made available by packet-processors and co-processors is a
definite benefit to the execution of a firewall algorithm, because of the large amount ofmemory
accesses that typically occur for firewall rule look-ups. If parallelism can be incorporated into
the rule look-up, the performance of the firewall will improve.
The implementation of the parallel firewall was significant in that it demonstrated the
abilities of network processors to be used in order to create more complex firewall architectures.
These more complex architectures are made possible because of the programmability of
network processors, but also the speed at which network processors are able to transfer packet
information between multiple systems.
In summary, the hardware assists and specialized packet processing abilities of network
processors provide a wide range of possibilities for implementing firewalls. The basic NP
packet filter and the parallel firewall provide a basis for more complex firewalls, including those
that might implement application level filtering or stateful inspection. The performance
improvements that are made available by network processors are certain to make them a
preferred platform for the creation of firewall systems in the future.
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5.2 Difficulties Encountered
In designing the network processor based firewall, several minor difficulties were
encountered. Some of those difficulties were specific to the IBM PowerNP 4GS3 architecture.
For example, the random deployment of packets to packet processors presented a challenging
model for executing the appropriate code for a given packet arriving on a specific port. In other
words, it would have been convenient to assign certain packet processor to execute a certain
portion of code relating to packets that enter on a specific port. This would have saved the need
to perform checks on the incoming ports in order to determine how the packet should be
processed. Instead, these port checks slowed down the performance of the network processor.
Another technical drawback encountered was a lack of semaphore operations available for use
by the NP assembly code. As stated previously, the NP is comprised of multiple packet
processors and co-processors, of which all could be accessing a shared memory value at any
given time. The shared memory location storing the current firewall node, used by the parallel
firewall switch machine, would be an example of this. This memory location could have been
read and updated by any of the packet processors at any given time; therefore allowing the
possibility of "write after
read"
errors (i.e. the second processor reads the shared value before
the first processor has updated the shared value to the new current firewall node). Providing a
hardware semaphore lock instruction would have simplified the process of synchronizing access
to the shared memory value.
The most challenging design step was the design of the tree structures used by the basic NP
firewall. This was true because it was necessary to both create efficient key structures and also
provide a wide range of abilities for the packet filter. For example, the firewall has the ability to
allow a filter on any existing any transport layer protocol and can filter on exact IP addresses or
on varying length network addresses. Generating flexible, efficient data structures will be
especially important in the design of network processor-based firewall, especially in the IBM
PowerNP 4GS3.
Another constraint encountered was the compliance with existing network protocols. This
was mainly evident in creating the parallel firewall. Because the switch communicated to the
firewall nodes via an IP network, it was necessary to design the switching algorithm around the
IP protocol rather than the communications abilities provided by the NP for inter-processor
communication. For example, the proprietary switch fabric available for connecting multiple
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IBM PowerNP 4GS3 processors would have been an ideal mechanism for connecting the
switch to the filtering nodes of the parallel firewall.
A final difficulty encountered was the lack of documentation to describe the process of
working with network processors. As network processors are a rather new technology, it is no
surprise that little documentation or research examples exists. Observing more existing
applications would have been beneficial. It is certain that developing firewall applications for
the NP will become less difficult as more research is performed in the future.
5.3 Benefits
Network processors hope to provide a much higher bandwidth for firewall
implementations. In addition to improved efficiency, the network processor will allow a greater
range of packet-filtering options. This could eventually include applicability to ATM packet-
filtering in addition to application level filtering achieved through observation of internal packet
characteristics.
The network processor also adds a new degree of flexibility to firewall implementation.
Existing firewalls and packet filtering hardware lack the ability to easily provide modification to
the firewall rule. Because of the programmable nature of network processors, a new firewall
implementation can quickly be applied to the target network.
Because network processors are a very new technology, it is important to obtain an
understanding of the architectural advantages for firewall implementation, but also to determine
the architectural shortcomings. This will lead to better use of existing network processor
resources in addition to identifying new algorithms and/or techniques for packet-filter that are
specific to Network Processor solutions.
5.4 FutureWork
Given the architectural abilities provided by network processors, there exist many
possibilities for future research in implementing firewalls using network processor technology.
An excellent first step is to begin implementing higher-level firewalls: application gateways and
stateful inspection firewalls. These types of firewalls would be able to further utilize the
advanced capabilities of network processors, particularly the abilities to modify packet content
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direcdy and to read into the application data of a given packet. This could allow user
authentication or proxy forwarding to occur all on the network processor, avoiding the slow
speeds ofOS processingwhere these functions typically occur in current firewalls.
The basic NP packet filter and parallel firewall described throughout this document could
also be enhanced to include more functionality. One useful addition to the basic packet filter
would be "urn-directional" filter. Stated differendy, the firewall could be upgraded to allow
certain traffic in only one direction across the firewall, for example allowing users to only telnet
from the inside to the outside of the protected network. The parallel firewall could be improved
by automating the switch machine. When one of the firewall machines goes offline, it would be
used for the switch to detect the crash, and re-route packets to a different firewall node
appropriately.
Given the firewall's dependencies on memory for accessing firewall rules, it would be highly
beneficial to perform a more detailed analysis of the effects produced by using different memory
modules. This would obviously be most useful after upgrading the test environment to use
actual network processor hardware, rather than simulated systems.
A final recommendation for further study is to pursue the advantages of using special
purpose switch fabrics to interconnect network processor-based firewalls. As described for the
parallel firewall, using an Ethernet-based network for inter-system communication would
ultimately deteriorate the performance of the firewall. A switch fabric between the network
processors would greatiy reduce the latency involved in data transfer between network processor
systems.
Firewalls have become one of the basic building blocks of implementing a network's
security policy; and therefore, should be made as efficient as possible. Because a firewall can
potentially lead to a bottleneck in the network, improving the performance of the firewallmeans
also improving the performance of the protected network. With their specialized packet
processing abilities and hardware support functions, network processors represent a new
generation of higher-speed, more affective firewalls.
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APPENDIXA - FIREWALL VENDORS
1 . Advanced Network and Services, Inc. (InterLock Firewall) - http://ww.ans.com
2. AltaVista Software (Firewall 98 - The Active Firewall)
3. AXENT (Raptor) - http://wvvw.raptor.com or http://www.axent.com
4. Cisco Systems (PIX Firewall) - www.cisco.com
5. Check Point Software Technologies (Firewall 1) - http: / /wwvv.checkpoint.com
6. CyberGuard (CyberGuard Firewall) - http: /Avww.cybg.com
7. CYCON (Labyrinth) - http: / /www.CTcon.com
8. Global Technology (GNAT Box) - http: / /www.gnatbox.com
9. MilkyWay (SecurIT FIREWALL) - http://milk7hway.com
10. NetGuard Ltd. (Guardian) http: / /www.netguard.com
1 1 . Network- 1 Software and Technology (CyberWall Plus, FireWall Plus) - http: / /www.network- 1 .com
12. Secure Computing (Sidewinder, Borderware Firewall) - http://www.securecomputing.com
13. Sun Microsystems (SunScreen Firewall Suite, Solstice FireWall) - http: /Avww.sun.com
14. Technologic (Interceptor Firewall) - http: /Avw.dogic.com
15. Trusted Information Systems (Gaundet Internet Firewall) - http: /Avww.tis.com
1 6. WatchGuard Technologies (Firebox) - http: /Avww.watchguard.com
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APPENDIX B - NETWORK PROCESSORVENDORS
1 . Agere Systems (NPFPP, NPRSP) - http://www.agere.com
2. Chrysalis-ITS (Luna 340) - http: / /www.chrysalisits.com
3. Conexant Systems (MXT4400, CX27510) - http: /Avww.conexant.com
4. EZ Chip Technologies (NP-1) - http: / Avww.ezchip.com
5. Fast-Chip Incorporated (PolicyEdge) - http://www.fast-chip.com
6. Intel Corporation (LXP1200, IXP220, LXP225) - http://www.intel.com
7. International Business Machines (NP4GS3, NPr2.7, NPe405x) - http: / /www.chips.ibm.com
8. InternetMachines http: / /www.internetmacliines.com
9. Lara Networks (NAP Family) http: /Avww.laranetworks.com
10. Lexra (LX8000, NetVortex OC192) - http: /Avww.lexra.com
1 1 . MMC Networks (EPIF, XPIF, GPIF) - http: / /www.mmcnetworks.com
12. Motorola (C5DCP) - http: /Avww.e-motorola.com
13. SiberCore Technologies (SiberCAM Ultra-2M) - http: /Avww.sibercore.com
14. SiliconAccess Networks (iFlow Family) - http: /Avww.siliconaccess.com
15. Vitesse Semiconductor Corporation (OctoalMAC,IQ2000) - http: / /www.vitesse.com
16. ZettaCom Incorporated (ZEN, ZET Families) - http: /Avww.2ettac0m.com
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